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ABSTRACT
This paper specifies a new convenient algorithm to construct policy projections conditional on alternative
anticipated policy-rate paths in linearized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models,
such as Ramses, the Riksbank's main DSGE model. Such projections with anticipated policy-rate paths
correspond to situations where the central bank transparently announces that it, conditional on current
information, plans to implement a particular policy-rate path and where this announced plan for the
policy rate is believed and then anticipated by the private sector. The main idea of the algorithm is
to include among the predetermined variables (the "state" of the economy) the vector of nonzero means













This paper speci￿es a new convenient way to construct policy projections conditional on alternative
anticipated policy-rate paths in linearized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models,
such as Ramses, the Riksbank￿ s main DSGE model.1 Such projections with anticipated policy-rate
paths correspond to situations where the central bank transparently announces that it, conditional
on current information, plans to implement a particular policy-rate path and where this announced
plan for the policy rate is believed and then anticipated by the private sector. Such projections are
particularly relevant for central banks such as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), Norges
Bank, the Riksbank, and the Czech National Bank (CNB), where the policy announcement includes
not only the current policy rate decision but also a forecast path for the future policy rate. They
are also relevant in the discussion about the kind of ￿forward guidance￿about the future policy
rate that the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of Canada have recently given.
A common method to do policy simulations for alternative policy-rate paths is to add unantici-
pated shocks to a given instrument rule (a rule that speci￿es the policy rate as a function of observed
variables), as in the method of modest interventions by Leeper and Zha [22] (see appendix D). That
method is designed to deal with policy simulations that involve ￿modest￿unanticipated deviations
from a given instrument rule. Such policy simulations correspond to a situation when the central
bank would nontransparently and secretly plan to surprise the private sector by deviations from
an announced instrument rule (or, alternatively a situation when the central bank announces and
follows a future path but the path is not believed by and each period surprises the private sector).
Aside from corresponding to policy that is either non-transparent or lacks credibility, such devia-
tions are in practical simulations often both serially correlated and large, which can be inconsistent
with the assumption that they would remain unanticipated and interpreted as i.i.d. shocks by the
private sector. In other words, they are in practice often not ￿modest￿in the sense of Leeper and
Zha. Projections with anticipated policy-rate paths would in many cases seem more relevant for
the transparent ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting that central banks such as the RBNZ, Norges Bank, the
Riksbank, and the CNB conduct.2
A standard way to incorporate anticipated shocks (that is, shocks with non-zero time-varying
means) in an economic model with forward-looking variables is to use a deterministic, perfect-
1 The policy rate (also called the instrument rate) is the short interest rate that the central bank uses as a (policy)
instrument (control variable). For the Riksbank, the policy rate is the repo rate.
2 However, as noted in Svensson [33], there are recent cases when the Riksbank￿ s policy-rate path has been far
from credible and when projections with unanticipated shocks may be more relevant.
1foresight variant of the model where all future shocks are set equal to their means and are assumed
to be known in the ￿rst period. Furthermore, a ￿nite horizon is assumed, with a terminal condition
where all variables equal their steady-state values. The problem can then be seen as a two-point
boundary problem with an initial and a terminal condition. Stacking the model equations for
the ￿nite number of periods together with the initial and terminal condition gives rise to a ￿nite-
dimensional simultaneous equation system, nonlinear for a nonlinear model and linear for a linear
model. The model can then be solved with the Fair-Taylor [13] algorithm or the so-called Stacked
Time algorithm of La⁄argue [21], Boucekkine [11], and Juillard [19]. The horizon is extended until
it has a negligible e⁄ect on the solution.3 The Dynare [12] collection of MatLab and Octave routines
uses the Stacked Time algorithm for deterministic, perfect-foresight settings.
Assuming a linear model (a linearized DSGE model), we provide an alternative simple and
convenient algorithm that allows a stochastic interpretation ￿more precisely a standard state-space
representation of a stochastic linear model with forward-looking variables, the solution of which
can be expressed in a recursive form and found with standard algorithms for the solution of linear
rational-expectations systems, such as the Klein [20], Sims [28], or AIM algorithms (Anderson and
Moore [9] and [10]). The main idea is to include among the predetermined variables (the ￿state￿of
the economy) the vector of nonzero means of future shocks to a given instrument rule. By modelling
the shocks as a moving-average process ￿more precisely, the sum of zero-mean i.i.d. shocks ￿we
allow a consistent stochastic interpretation of new information about the nonzero means. The
policy-rate path can then be written as a function of the initial state of the economy, including
the vector of anticipated shocks, and the vector of anticipated shocks can be chosen so as to result
in any desired anticipated policy-rate path. This is a special case of the more general analysis of
judgment in monetary policy in Svensson [31] and of optimal policy projections with judgment in
Svensson and Tetlow [34].
Our algorithm thus adds an anticipated sequence of shocks to a general but constant policy rule,
including targeting rules (conditions on the target variables, the variables that are the arguments of
the loss function) and explicit or implicit instrument rules (instrument rules where the policy rate
depends on predetermined variables only or also on forward-looking variables). It very conveniently
allows the construction of policy projections for alternative arbitrary nominal and real policy-rate
paths, whether or not these are optimal for a particular loss function or not.
We consider policy simulations where restrictions on the nominal or real policy-rate path are
3 That is, one need only extend the horizon until such a point that the extension no longer a⁄ects the simulated
results over the horizon of interest. This is a ￿type III iteration￿in the parlance of Fair and Taylor [13].
2eventually followed by an anticipated future switch to a given well-behaved policy rule, either
optimal or arbitrary. With such a setup, there is a unique equilibrium for each speci￿ed set of
restrictions on the nominal or real policy-rate path. The equilibrium will, in a model with forward-
looking variables, depend on which future policy rule is implemented, but for any given such
policy rule, the equilibrium is unique. It is well known since Sargent and Wallace [27] that an
exogenous nominal policy-rate path will normally lead to indeterminacy in a model with forward-
looking variables (and to an explosive development in a backward-looking model), so at some
future time the nominal policy-rate must become endogenous for a well-behaved equilibrium to
result (see also Gagnon and Henderson [14]). Such a setup with a switch to a well-behaved policy
rule solves the problem with multiple equilibria for alternative policy-rate projections that Gali [15]
has emphasized. On the other hand, consistent with Gali￿ s results, the unique equilibrium depends
on and is sensitive to both the time of the switch and the policy rule to which policy shifts.
We demonstrated our method for three di⁄erent models, namely the small empirical backward-
looking model of the U.S. economy of Rudebusch and Svensson [26], the small empirical forward-
looking model of the U.S. economy of LindØ [23], and Ramses, the medium-sized model of the
Swedish economy of Adolfson, LasØen, LindØ, and Villani [4].4 From the examples examined in this
paper, we see that, in a model without forward-looking variables such as the Rudebusch-Svensson
model, there is no di⁄erence between policy simulations with anticipated and unanticipated restric-
tions on the policy-rate path. In a model with forward-looking variables, such as the LindØ model
or Ramses, there is such a di⁄erence, and the impact of anticipated restrictions would generally
be larger than that of unanticipated restrictions. In a model with forward-looking variables, ex-
ogenous restrictions on the policy-rate path are consistent with a unique equilibrium, if there is a
switch to a well-behaved policy rule in the future. For given restrictions on the policy-rate path,
the equilibrium depends on that policy rule.
If in￿ ation is su¢ ciently sensitive to the real policy rate, ￿unusual￿equilibria may result from
restrictions for su¢ ciently many quarters on the nominal policy rate. Such cases have the property
that a shift up of the real interest-rate path reduces in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations so much
that the nominal interest-rate path (which by the Fisher equation equals the real interest-rate path
plus the path of in￿ ation expectations) shifts down. Then, a shift up of the nominal interest-rate
path requires an equilibrium where the path of in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations shifts up more
and the real policy-rate path shifts down. In the Rudebusch-Svensson model, which has no forward-
4See also Adolfson, LasØen, LindØ, and Villani [5] and [6].
3looking variables, in￿ ation is so sluggish and insensitive to changes in the real policy rate that there
are only small di⁄erences between restrictions on the nominal and real policy rate. In the LindØ
model, in￿ ation is so sensitive to the real policy rate that restrictions for 5￿ 6 quarters or more on
the nominal policy rate result in unusual equilibria. In Ramses, unusual equilibria seem to require
restrictions for 10 quarters or more. In order to avoid unusual equilibria, restrictions should be
imposed for fewer quarters than that.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the state-space representation of a lin-
ear(ized) DSGE model and shows how to do policy simulations with an arbitrary constant (that
is, time-invariant) policy rule, such as an instrument rule or a targeting rule. Section 3 shows our
convenient way of constructing policy projections that satisfy arbitrary anticipated restrictions on
the nominal or real policy rate by introducing anticipated time-varying deviations in the policy
rule. Section 4 provides examples of restrictions on nominal and real policy-rate paths for the
Rudebusch-Svensson model, the LindØ model, and Ramses. Section 5 presents some conclusions.
A few appendices contain some technical details. Appendix A speci￿es the policy rule under
optimal policy under commitment. Appendices B and C provide some details on the Rudebusch-
Svensson and LindØ models, respectively. Appendix D demonstrates the Leeper and Zha [22]
method of modest interventions in this framework.
2. The model
A linear model with forward-looking variables (such as a DSGE model like Ramses that is linearized
















for t = :::;￿1;0;1;:::. Here, Xt is an nX-vector of predetermined variables in period t (where the
period is a quarter); xt is an nx-vector of forward-looking variables; it is generally an ni-vector of
(policy) instruments but in the cases examined here it is a scalar, the policy rate, in the Riksbank￿ s
case the repo rate, so ni = 1; "t is an n"-vector of i.i.d. shocks with mean zero and covariance matrix
In"; A, B, and C, and H are matrices of the appropriate dimension; and for any stochastic process
yt, yt+￿jt denotes Etyt+￿, the rational expectation of yt+￿ conditional on information available in
period t. The forward-looking variables and the instruments are the nonpredetermined variables.5
5 A variable is predetermined if its one-period-ahead prediction error is an exogenous stochastic process (Klein
[20]). For (2.1), the one-period-ahead prediction error of the predetermined variables is the stochastic vector C"t+1.
4The variables can be measured as di⁄erences from steady-state values, in which case their
unconditional means are zero. Alternatively, one of the components of Xt can be unity, so as to
allow the variables to have nonzero means. The elements of the matrices A, B, C, and H are
normally estimated with Bayesian methods. Here they are considered ￿xed and known for the
policy simulations. More precisely, the matrices are considered structural, for instance, functions
of the deep parameters in an underlying linearized DSGE model. Hence, with a linear model with
additive uncertainty and a quadratic loss function as speci￿ed in appendix A, the conditions for
certainty equivalence are satis￿ed, that is, mean forecasts are su¢ cient for policy decisions.
The upper block of (2.1) provides nX equations determining the nX-vector Xt+1 in period t+1
for given Xt, xt, it and "t+1;
Xt+1 = A11Xt + A12xt + B1it + C"t+1; (2.2)












The lower block provides nx equations determining xt in period t for given xt+1jt, Xt, and it;
xt = A￿1
22 (Hxt+1jt ￿ A21Xt ￿ B2it): (2.4)
Hence, we assume that the nx ￿ nx submatrix A22 is nonsingular, which assumption must be
satis￿ed by any reasonable model with forward-looking variables.6
In a backward-looking model, that is, a model without forward-looking variables, there is no
vector xt of forward-looking variables and no lower block of equations in (2.1).
With a constant (that is, time-invariant) arbitrary instrument rule, the policy rate satis￿es






where the ni ￿ (nX + nx) matrix [fX fx] is a given (linear) instrument rule and partitioned
conformably with Xt and xt. If fx ￿ 0, the instrument rule is an explicit instrument rule; if fx 6= 0,
the instrument rule is an implicit instrument rule. In the latter case, the instrument rule is actually
an equilibrium condition, in the sense that in a real-time analogue the policy rate in period t and
the forward-looking variables in period t would be simultaneously determined.
6 Without loss of generality, we assume that the shocks "t only enter in the upper block of (2.1), since any shocks
in the lower block of (2.1) can be rede￿ned as additional predetermined variables and introduced in the upper block.
5The instrument rule that is estimated for Ramses is of the form (see the appendix of Adolfson,
LasØen, LindØ, and Svensson [1] (ALLS1) for the notation)

















t ￿ ^ ￿c
t￿1
￿
+ r￿y (^ yt ￿ ^ yt￿1) + "Rt:
Since ^ ￿c
t and ^ yt, the deviation of CPI in￿ ation and output from trend, are forward-looking variables
in Ramses, this is an implicit instrument rule.
An arbitrary more general (linear) policy rule (G;f) can be written as
Gxxt+1jt + Giit+1jt = fXXt + fxxt + fiit; (2.7)
where the ni ￿ (nx + ni) matrix G ￿ [Gx Gi] is partitioned conformably with xt and it and the
ni ￿ (nX + nx + ni) matrix f ￿ [fX fx fi] is partitioned conformably with Xt, xt, and it. This
general policy rule includes explicit, implicit, and forecast-based instrument rules (in the latter the
policy rate depends on expectations of future forward-looking variables, xt+1jt) as well as targeting
rules (conditions on current, lagged, or expected future target variables).7 When this general policy
rule is an instrument rule, we require the nx ￿ ni matrix fi to be nonsingular, so (2.7) determines
it for given Xt, xt, xt+1jt, and it+1jt.
The optimal instrument rule under commitment (see appendix A) can be written as
0 = FiXXt + Fi￿￿t￿1 ￿ it; (2.8)
where the matrix Fi in (A.6) is partitioned conformably with Xt and ￿t￿1. Here the nx-vector of
Lagrange multipliers ￿t in equilibrium follows
￿t = M￿XXt + M￿￿￿t￿1; (2.9)
where the matrix M in (A.5) has been portioned conformably with Xt and ￿t￿1. Thus, in order to
include this optimal instrument rule in the set of policy rules (2.7) considered, the predetermined
variables need to be augmented with ￿t￿1 and the equations for the predetermined variables with
(2.9). For simplicity, the treatment below does not include this augmentation. Alternatively,
below the vector of predetermined variables could consistently be augmented with the vector of
Lagrange multipliers, so everywhere we would have (X0
t;￿0
t￿1)0 instead of Xt, with corresponding
augmentation of the relevant matrices.
7 A targeting rule can be expressed in terms of expected leads, current values, and lags of the target variables (the
arguments of the loss function); see Svensson [30], Svensson and Woodford [35], and Giannoni and Woodford [16].
6The general policy rule can be added to the model equations (2.1) to form the new system to
be solved. With the notation ~ xt ￿ (x0
t;i0






























and where ~ H is partitioned conformably with xt and it and ~ A is partitioned conformably with Xt,
xt, and it.
Then, under the assumption that the policy rule gives rise to the saddlepoint property (that the
number of eigenvalues with modulus greater than unity is equal to the number of non-predetermined
variables), the system can be solved with the Klein [20] algorithm or the other algorithms for the
solution of linear rational-expectations models mentioned in the introduction. The Klein algorithm
generates the matrices M and F such that the resulting equilibrium satis￿es












for t = :::;￿1;0;1;:::, where the matrices M and F depend on ~ A and ~ H, and thereby on A, B, H,
G, and f.
In a backward-looking model, the time-invariant instrument rule depends on the vector of
predetermined variables only, since there are no forward-looking variables, and the vector ~ xt is
identical to it.
Consider now projections in period t, that is, mean forecasts, conditional on information avail-
able in period t, of future realizations of the variables. For any stochastic vector process ut, let
ut ￿ fut+￿;tg1
￿=0 denote a projection in period t, where ut+￿;t denotes the mean forecast of the
realization of the vector in period t + ￿ conditional on information available in period t. We refer
to ￿ as the horizon of the forecast ut+￿;t.
The projection (Xt;xt;it) in period t is then given by (2.11) and (2.12) when we set the mean
of future i.i.d. shocks equal to zero, "t+￿;t = Et"t+￿ = 0 for ￿ > 0. It then satis￿es

















Xt;t = Xtjt; (2.15)
for ￿ ￿ 0, where Xtjt is the estimate of predetermined variables in period t conditional on informa-
tion available in the beginning of period t. Thus, ￿;t￿and ￿jt￿in subindices refer to projections
(forecasting) and estimates (￿nowcasting￿and ￿backcasting￿ ) in the beginning of period t, respec-
tively.
3. Projections with time-varying restrictions on the policy rate
The projection of the policy rate it = fit+￿;tg1
￿=0 in period t is by (2.14) given by
it+￿;t = FiM￿Xt+￿;t
for ￿ ￿ 0.8
Suppose now that we consider imposing restrictions on the policy-rate projection of the form
it+￿;t = ￿ {t+￿;t; ￿ = 0;:::;T; (3.1)
where f￿ {t+￿;tgT
￿=0 is a sequence of T+1 given policy-rate levels. Alternatively, we can have restriction
on the real policy-rate projection of the form
rt+￿;t = ￿ rt+￿;t; ￿ = 0;:::;T; (3.2)
where
rt ￿ it ￿ ￿t+1jt (3.3)
is the real policy rate and ￿t+1jt is expected in￿ ation. With restrictions of this kind, the nominal
or real policy rate is exogenous for period t;t + 1;:::;t + T.
These restrictions are here assumed to be anticipated by both the central bank and the private
sector, in contrast to Leeper and Zha [22] where they are anticipated and planned by the central
bank but not anticipated by the private sector. Thus, our case corresponds to a situation where
the restriction is announced to the private sector by the central bank and believed by the private
sector, whereas the Leeper and Zha case corresponds to a situation where the central bank either
8 The projection of the policy rate and the other variables will satisfy the policy rule,
Gxxt+￿+1;t + Giit+￿+1;t = fXXt+￿;t + fxxt+￿;t + fiit+￿;t;
for ￿ ￿ 0.
8makes secret plans to implement the restriction or the restriction is announced but not believed by
the private sector.
The restrictions make the nominal or real policy-rate projection exogenous for the periods t,
t + 1, ..., t + T. We know from Sargent and Wallace [27] that exogenous interest rates may cause
indeterminacy when there are forward-looking variables. In order to ensure determinacy, we assume
that there is an anticipated switch in period t+T +1 to the policy rule (G;f). Then the restrictions
can be implemented by augmenting a stochastic deviation, zt; to the policy rule (2.7),
Gxxt+1jt + Giit+1jt = fXXt + fxxt + fiit + zt: (3.4)
The projection fzt+￿;tgT
￿=0 of the future deviations is then chosen such that (3.1) or (3.2) is satis￿ed.
The projection of the future deviation from the horizon T + 1 and beyond is zero, corresponding
to the anticipated shift then to the policy rule (G;f).
More precisely, we let the (T + 1)-vector zt ￿ (zt;t;zt+1;t;:::;zt+T;t)0 (where zt;t = zt) denote
a projection of the stochastic variable zt+￿ for ￿ = 0;:::;T. As in the treatment of central-bank
judgment in Svensson [31], the stochastic variable zt is called the deviation. In particular, we
assume that the deviation is a moving-average process that satis￿es




for a given T ￿ 0, where ￿t ￿ (￿0
t;t;￿0
t+1;t;:::;￿0
t+T;t)0 is a zero-mean i.i.d. random (T + 1)-vector
realized in the beginning of period t and called the innovation in period t. For T = 0, we have
zt = ￿t;t, and the deviation is a simple i.i.d. disturbance. For T > 0, the deviation instead follows
a moving-average process. Then we have
zt+￿;t+1 = zt+￿;t + ￿t+￿;t+1; ￿ = 1;:::;T;
zt+T+1;t+1 = ￿t+T+1;t+1:
It follows that the dynamics of the deviation and the projection zt can be written
zt+1 = Azzt + ￿t+1; (3.5)







9Hence, zt is the central bank￿ s mean projection of current and future deviations, and ￿t can be
interpreted as the new information the central bank receives in the beginning of period t about
those deviations.9
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Under the assumption of the saddlepoint property, the system of di⁄erence equations (3.6) has
a unique solution and there exist unique matrices M and F such that projection can be written
~ Xt+￿;t = M￿ ~ Xt;t;
~ xt+￿;t = F ~ Xt+￿;t = FM￿ ~ Xt;t
for ￿ ￿ 0, where Xt;t in ~ Xt;t ￿ (X0
t;t;zt0)0 is given but the (T+1)-vector zt remains to be determined.
Its elements are then determined by the restrictions (3.1) or (3.2).







= ￿ {t+￿;t; ￿ = 0;1;:::;T:
This provides T + 1 linear equations for the T + 1 elements of zt.
In order to instead satisfy the restriction (3.2) on the real policy rate, we note that in￿ ation
expectations in a DSGE model similar to Ramses generally satisfy





for some vectors ’ and ￿. These vectors ’ and ￿ are structural, not reduced-form expressions.
For instance, if ￿t is one of the elements of xt, the corresponding element of ’ is unity, all other
9 In Svensson [31] the deviation zt is an nz-vector of terms entering the di⁄erent equations in the model, and the
projection z
t of future zt deviation is identi￿ed with central-bank judgment. The graphs in Svensson [31] can be seen
as impulse responses to ￿
t, the new information about future deviations. (The notation here is slightly di⁄erent from
Svensson [31] in that there the projection z
t ￿ (zt+1;t;:::;zt+T;t)
0 does not include the current deviation.)
10elements of ’ are zero, and ￿ ￿ 0. If ￿t+1jt is one of the elements of ~ xt, the corresponding element
of ￿ is unity, all other elements of ￿ are zero, and ’ ￿ 0. Then the restriction (3.2) can be written





= ￿ rt+￿;t; ￿ = 0;1;:::;T:
This again provides T + 1 linear equations for the T + 1 elements of zt.
When the restriction is on the nominal policy rate, we can think of the equilibrium as being
implemented by the central bank announcing the nominal policy-rate path and the private sector
incorporating this policy-rate projection in their expectations, with the understanding that the
policy rate will be set according to the given policy rule (G;f) from period t + T + 1. When the
restriction is on the real policy rate, we need to consider the fact that in practice central banks
set nominal policy rates, not real ones. The restriction on the real policy rate will result in an
endogenously determined nominal policy-rate projection, which together with the endogenously
determined in￿ ation projection will be consistent with the real policy-rate path. We can then think
of the equilibrium as being implemented by the central bank calculating that nominal policy-rate
projection and then announce it to the private sector.
3.1. Backward-looking model
In a backward-looking model, the projection of the instrument rule with the time-varying con-
straints can be written
it+￿;t = fXXt+￿;t + zt+￿;t; (3.8)
so it is trivial to determine the projection zt recursively so as to satisfy the restriction (3.1) on the
nominal policy-rate projection.
In￿ ation can be written
￿t = ￿Xt
for some vector ￿, so expected in￿ ation can be written
￿t+1jt = ￿Xt+1jt = ￿(AXt + Bit): (3.9)
By combining (3.8), (3.9) and (3.3), it is trivial to determine the projection zt so as to satisfy the
restriction (3.2) on the real policy-rate projection.
114. Examples
In this section we examine restrictions on the nominal and real policy-rate path for the backward-
looking Rudebusch-Svensson model and the two forward-looking models, the LindØ model and
Ramses. Appendices B and C provide some details on the Rudebusch-Svensson and LindØ models.
We also show a simulation with Ramses with the method of modest interventions by Leeper and
Zha. Appendix D provides some details on the Leeper-Zha method.
4.1. The Rudebusch-Svensson model
The backward-looking empirical Rudebusch-Svensson model [26] has two equations (with estimates
rounded to two decimal points),
￿t+1 = 0:70￿t ￿ 0:10￿t￿1 + 0:28￿t￿2 + 0:12￿t￿3 + 0:14yt + "￿;t+1; (4.1)












The period is a quarter, ￿t is quarterly GDP in￿ ation measured in percentage points at an annual
rate, yt is the output gap measured in percentage points, and it is the quarterly average of the
federal funds rate, measured in percentage points at an annual rate. All variables are measured
as di⁄erences from their means, their steady-state levels. The predetermined variables are Xt ￿
(￿t;￿t￿1;￿t￿2;￿t￿2;yt;yt￿1;it￿1;it￿2;it￿3)0. See appendix B for details.
The target variables are in￿ ation, the output gap, and the ￿rst-di⁄erence of the federal funds






t + ￿￿i(it ￿ it￿1)2]; (4.3)
where ￿t is measured as the di⁄erence from the in￿ ation target, which is equal to the steady-
state level. The discount factor, ￿, and the relative weights on output-gap stabilization, ￿y, and
interest-rate smoothing, ￿￿i, are set to satisfy ￿ = 1, ￿y = 1, and ￿￿i = 0:2.
For the loss function (4.3) with the parameters ￿ = 1, ￿y = 1, and ￿￿i = 0:2, and the case where
"t is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean, the optimal instrument rule is (the coe¢ cients are rounded to
two decimal points)
it = 1:22￿t +0:43￿t￿1 +0:53￿t￿2 +0:18￿t￿3 +1:93yt ￿0:49yt￿1 +0:36it￿1 ￿0:09it￿2 ￿0:05it￿3:
Figure 4.1 shows projections for the Rudebusch-Svensson model. The top row of panels show
projections under the optimal policy, whereas the bottom row of panels show projections under a
12Figure 4.1: Projections for Rudebusch-Svensson model with unrestricted and restricted nominal
and real policy rate for optimal policy (top row) and Taylor rule (bottom row): 4-quarter restriction
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Taylor rule,
it = 1:5￿t + 0:5yt;
where the policy rate responds to the predetermined in￿ ation and output gap with the standard
coe¢ cients 1.5 and 0.5, respectively.
The projections start in quarter 0 from the steady state, when all the predetermined variables
are zero. The left column of panels show the projections when there is no restriction imposed on
the nominal or real policy-rate path. This corresponds to zero projected deviations zt+￿;t in the
optimal instrument rule and the Taylor rule. These are denoted by circles for the ￿rst four quarters,
quarters 0￿ 3. The economy remains in the steady state, and in￿ ation (denoted by a dashed curve),
the output gap (denoted by a dashed-dotted curve), the nominal policy rate (denoted by a solid
curve), and the real policy rate (denoted by a dotted curve) all remain at zero.
13The middle column shows projections when the nominal policy-rate is restricted to equal 25
basis points for the ￿rst four quarters. For both the optimal policy and the Taylor rule, this requires
positive and (except for quarter 1) increasing time-varying projected deviations in the instrument
rule. The upward shift in quarters 0￿ 3 in the nominal policy-rate path reduces in￿ ation and
expected in￿ ation somewhat, and the real policy rate path shifts up a bit more than the nominal
policy-rate path. The increased real policy rate also reduces the output gap. In the Rudebusch-
Svensson model, in￿ ation is very sluggish and the output gap responds more to the nominal and
real policy rate than in￿ ation. From quarter 4, there is no restriction on the policy-rate path, and
according to both the optimal policy and the Taylor rule, the nominal and real policy rate are
reduced substantially so as to bring the negative in￿ ation and output gap eventually back to zero.
The optimal policy is more e⁄ective in bringing back in￿ ation and the output gap than the Taylor
rule, which is natural since the Taylor rule is not optimal.
The right column shows projections when the real policy rate is restricted to equal unity during
quarters 0￿ 3. Since there is so little movement in in￿ ation and expected in￿ ation, the projections
for these restrictions on the real and the nominal policy rate are very similar.
Since there are no forward-looking variables in the Rudebusch-Svensson model, there would be
no di⁄erence between these projections with anticipated restrictions on the policy-rate path and
simulations with unanticipated shocks as in Leeper and Zha [22].
4.2. The LindØ model
The empirical New Keynesian model of the US economy due to LindØ [23] also has two equations.
We use the following parameter estimates,
￿t = 0:457￿t+1jt + (1 ￿ 0:457)￿t￿1 + 0:048yt + "￿t;
yt = 0:425yt+1jt + (1 ￿ 0:425)yt￿1 ￿ 0:156(it ￿ ￿t+1jt) + "yt:
The period is a quarter, and ￿t is quarterly GDP in￿ ation measured in percentage points at an
annual rate, yt is the output gap measured in percentage points, and it is the quarterly average of
the federal funds rate, measured in percentage points at an annual rate. All variables are measured
as di⁄erences from their means, their steady-state levels. The shock "t ￿ ("￿t;"yt)0 is i.i.d. with
mean zero.
For the loss function (4.3), the predetermined variables are Xt ￿ ("￿t;"yt;￿t￿1;yt￿1;it￿1)0 (the
lagged policy rate enters because it enters into the loss function, and the two shocks are included
14Figure 4.2: Projections for the LindØ model with unrestricted and restricted nominal and real policy
rate for optimal policy (top row) and Taylor rule (bottom row): 4-quarter restriction






Restr. on nominal policy rate
Quarter





















Restr. on real policy rate
Quarter






Restr. on nominal policy rate
Quarter




























among the predetermined variables in order to write the model on the form (2.1) with no shocks in
the equations for the forward-looking variables). The forward-looking variables are xt ￿ (￿t;yt)0.
See appendix C for details.10
For the loss function (4.3) with the parameters ￿ = 1, ￿y = 1, and ￿￿i = 0:2, the optimal policy
function (2.8) is (the coe¢ cients are rounded to two decimal points),
it = 1:06"￿t + 1:38"yt + 0:58￿t￿1 + 0:78yt￿1 + 0:40 it￿1 + 0:02￿￿;t￿1;t￿1 + 0:20￿y;t￿1;t￿1;
where ￿￿;t￿1;t￿1 and ￿y;t￿1;t￿1 are the Lagrange multipliers for the two equations for the forward-
looking variables in the decision problem in period t￿1 (see appendix A). The di⁄erence equation
10 It is arguably unrealistic to consider in￿ ation and output in the current quarter as forward-looking variables.
Alternatively, current in￿ ation and the output gap could be treated as predetermined, and one-quarter-ahead plans
for in￿ ation, the output gap, and the policy rate could be determined by the model above. Such a variant of the New
Keynesian model is used in Svensson and Woodford [35].
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We also examine the projections for a Taylor rule for which the policy rate responds to current
in￿ ation and the output gap,
it = 1:5￿t + 0:5yt:
Figure 4.2 shows projections for the optimal policy (top row) and Taylor rule (bottom row) when
there is a restriction to equal 25 basis points for quarters 0￿ 3 for the nominal policy rate (middle
column) and the real policy rate (right column). In the middle column, we see that a restriction
to a 25 basis points higher nominal policy rate reduces in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations so the
projection of the real policy rate is above 25 basis points and higher than the policy rate for the
￿rst four quarters. In line with this, in the right column, the restriction on the real policy rate
reduces in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations so the corresponding nominal policy-rate projection
is below 25 basis points. We note that these restrictions require positive and rising time-varying
projected deviations (denoted by the circles). The magnitude of the projected deviations is larger
than those in ￿gure 4.1 for the Rudebusch-Svensson model. Using the magnitude of the projected
deviations as indicating the severity of the restriction, we conclude that the restriction to nominal
or real policy rates equal to unity is more severe in the LindØ model.
Because in￿ ation is more sensitive to movements in the real policy rate in the LindØ model
than in the Rudebusch-Svensson model, there is a greater di⁄erence between restrictions on the
nominal and the real policy rate. Also, from quarter 4, when there is no restriction on the policy
rate, a fall in the real and nominal policy rate, according to both the optimal policy and the
Taylor rule, more easily stabilizes in￿ ation and the output gap back to the steady state than in the
Rudebusch-Svensson model.
4.3. Ramses
ALLS1 provides more details on Ramses, including the elements of the vectors Xt, xt, it, and "t.
Figure 4.3 shows projections with Ramses for the estimated instrument rule. The top row shows the
result of restrictions on the nominal and real policy rate to equal 25 basis points for four quarters,
quarters 0￿ 3. We see that there is a substantial di⁄erence between restrictions on the nominal
16Figure 4.3: Projections for Ramses with anticipated unrestricted and restricted nominal and real
policy rate (top row) and unanticipated restrictions on the nominal policy rate (bottom row):
4-quarter restriction
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and the real policy rate, since in￿ ation is quite sensitive to the real policy rate in Ramses. In the
top middle panel, we see that a restriction on the nominal policy-rate projection to equal 25 basis
points for quarters 0￿ 3 corresponds to a very high and falling real policy-rate projection. In the top
right panel we see that the restriction on the real policy rate to equal 25 basis points for quarters
0￿ 3 corresponds to a nominal policy-rate projection quite a bit below the real policy rate.
The bottom panel of ￿gure 4.3 shows the result of a projection with the Leeper-Zha method
of modest interventions to implement a restriction on the nominal policy rate to equal 25 basis
points for quarters 0￿ 3. There, positive unanticipated shocks (denoted by circles) are added to the
estimated instrument rule to achieve the restriction on the nominal policy rate. Comparing the
bottom panel to the top right panel, we see that the impact on in￿ ation, the output gap, and the
real interest rate is smaller for the unanticipated shocks in the Leeper-Zha method than for the
anticipated projected deviations in our method.
17Figure 4.4: Projections for Ramses with anticipated unrestricted and restricted nominal and real
policy rate (top row) and unanticipated restrictions on the nominal policy rate (bottom row):
9-quarter restriction
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If restrictions are imposed on the nominal policy rate for many periods, ￿unusual￿equilibria can
occur. We can illustrate this for Ramses in ￿gure 4.4, where in panel b the nominal policy rate
is restricted to equal 25 basis points for 9 quarters, quarters 0￿ 8. This is a very contractionary
policy, which shows in in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations falling very much and the real policy rate
becoming very high. (Note that the scale varies from panel to panel in ￿gure 4.4.) If we look at
panel c, where the real policy rate is restricted to equal 25 basis points for 9 quarters, we see that
in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations fall so much that the nominal policy rate becomes negative in
quarter 0 (relative to when there is no restriction) and then rises to become positive only in quarter
7 and 8. We realize that, if in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations respond so much that nominal and
18Figure 4.5: Projections for Ramses with anticipated unrestricted and restricted nominal and real
policy rate (top row) and unanticipated restrictions on the nominal policy rate (bottom row):
10-quarter restriction
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real policy rates move in opposite directions, some unusual equilibria may arise. This is con￿rmed
in ￿gure 4.5, where in panel b the nominal policy rate is restricted at 25 basis points for one more
quarter, quarter 9. We see that then there is no longer an equilibrium where the real policy rate
is positive and high. Instead the equilibrium is such that the real policy rate is negative, policy is
very expansionary, and in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations are high.
This phenomenon of unusual equilibria clearly requires that in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations
are quite sensitive to the real policy rate so that for multiple-period restrictions the nominal and
real policy rate moves in opposite directions. It requires as much as around 10-quarter restrictions
to occur in Ramses. In the LindØ model, in￿ ation is more sensitive to the real policy rate, so
there it can occur already at 6-quarter restrictions. We have not observed the phenomenon in the
19Rudebusch-Svensson model even for very long restrictions.
The phenomenon implies that restrictions for many quarters should be avoided in models where
in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations are su¢ ciently sensitive to the real policy rate.
5. Conclusions
We have presented a new convenient way to construct projections conditional on alternative antic-
ipated policy-rate paths in linearized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, such
as Ramses, the Riksbank￿ s main DSGE model. The main idea is to include the anticipated future
time-varying deviations from a policy rule in the vector of predetermined variables, the ￿state￿of
the economy. This allows the formulation of the linear(ized) model on a standard state-space form,
the application of standard algorithms for the solution of linear rational-expectations models, and
a recursive representation of the equilibrium projections. Projections for anticipated policy-rate
paths are especially relevant for central banks, such as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Norges
Bank, the Riksbank, and the Czech National Bank, that publish a policy-rate path, but they are
also relevant for the discussion of the kind ￿forward guidance￿recently given by the Fed and Bank
of Canada.
From the examples in this paper, we have seen that, in a model without forward-looking vari-
ables such as the empirical model of the U.S. economy by Rudebusch and Svensson [26], there
is no di⁄erence between policy simulations with anticipated and unanticipated restrictions on the
policy-rate path. In a model with forward-looking variables, such as Ramses or the empirical New
Keynesian model of the U.S. economy by LindØ [23], there is such a di⁄erence, and the impact of
anticipated deviations from a policy rule will generally be larger than that of unanticipated devi-
ations. In a model with forward-looking variables, exogenous restrictions on the policy-rate path
are consistent with a unique equilibrium, if there is an anticipated switch to a well-behaved policy
rule in the future. For given restrictions on the policy-rate path, the equilibrium depends on that
policy rule.
Furthermore, our analysis shows that, if in￿ ation is su¢ ciently sensitive to the real policy rate,
￿unusual￿equilibria may result from restrictions on the nominal policy rate for su¢ ciently many
periods. Such cases have the property that nominal and real policy rates move in opposite directions
and nominal policy rates and in￿ ation (expectations) move in the same direction. This phenomenon
implies that restrictions on nominal policy rates for too many periods should be avoided.
20Appendix
A. Optimal policy
Let Yt be an nY -vector of target variables, measured as the di⁄erence from an nY -vector Y ￿ of target
levels. This is not restrictive, as long as we keep the target levels time-invariant. If we would like
to examine the consequences of di⁄erent target levels, we can instead interpret Yt as the absolute
level of the target levels and replace Yt by Yt ￿ Y ￿ everywhere below. We assume that the target
variables can be written as a linear function of the predetermined variables, the forward-looking
















where D is an nY ￿ (nX + nx + ni) matrix and partitioned conformably with Xt, xt, and it.





where 0 < ￿ < 1 is a discount factor, Lt is the period loss given by
Lt ￿ Y 0
t￿Yt; (A.3)
and ￿ is a symmetric positive semide￿nite matrix containing the weights on the individual target
variables.11
Optimization under commitment in a timeless perspective (Woodford [36]), which combined
with the model equations (2.1) results in a system of di⁄erence equations (see S￿derlind [29] and
Svensson [32]). The system of di⁄erence equations can be solved with several alternative algorithms,
for instance, those developed by Klein [20] and Sims [28] or the AIM algorithm of Anderson and
Moore [9] and [10] (see Svensson [31] and [32] for details of the derivation and the application of
the Klein algorithm). The equilibrium under optimal policy under commitment can be described





























11 For plotting and other purposes, and to avoid unnecessary separate program code, it is convenient to expand
the vector Yt to include a number of variables of interest that are not necessary target variables or potential target
variables. These will then have zero weight in the loss function.








These matrices depend on A, B, H, D, ￿, and ￿, but they are independent of C. That they
are independent of C demonstrates the certainty equivalence of optimal projections (the certainty
equivalence that holds when the model is linear, the loss function is quadratic, and the shocks and
the uncertainty are additive); only probability means of current and future variables are needed to
determine optimal policy and the optimal projection. The nx-vector ￿t consists of the Lagrange
multipliers of the lower block of (2.1), the block determining the projection of the forward-looking
variables. The initial value for ￿t￿1 is discussed in ALLS1.
In a backward-looking model, that is, a model without forward-looking variables, there is no
vector xt of forward-looking variables, no lower block of equations in (2.1), no Lagrange multiplier
￿t, and the vector of target variables Yt only depends on the vector of predetermined variables Xt
and the (vector of) instrument(s) it.
B. The Rudebusch-Svensson model: An empirical backward-looking model
The two equations of the model of Rudebusch and Svensson [26] are
￿t+1 = ￿￿1￿t + ￿￿2￿t￿1 + ￿￿3￿t￿2 + ￿￿4￿t￿3 + ￿yyt + z￿;t+1 (B.1)












where ￿t is quarterly in￿ ation in the GDP chain-weighted price index (Pt) in percentage points at
an annual rate, i.e., 400(lnPt ￿lnPt￿1); it is the quarterly average federal funds rate in percentage
points at an annual rate; yt is the relative gap between actual real GDP (Qt) and potential GDP
(Q￿
t) in percentage points, i.e., 100(Qt ￿ Q￿
t)=Q￿
t. These ￿ve variables were demeaned prior to
estimation, so no constants appear in the equations.
The estimated parameters, using the sample period 1961:1 to 1996:2, are shown in table B.1.
Table B.1

















The hypothesis that the sum of the lag coe¢ cients of in￿ ation equals one has a p-value of .16, so
this restriction was imposed in the estimation.
















































































































































where ej (j = 0;1;:::;9) denotes a 1￿9 row vector, for j = 0 with all elements equal to zero, for
j = 1;:::;9 with element j equal to unity and all other elements equal to zero; and where ej:k
(j < k) denotes a 1￿9 row vector with elements j;j + 1;:::;k equal to 1
4 and all other elements
equal to zero. The predetermined variables are ￿t, ￿t￿1, ￿t￿2, ￿t￿3, yt, yt￿1, it￿1, it￿2, it￿2, and
it￿3. There are no forward-looking variables.
For a loss function (4.3) with ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1, and ￿ = 0:2, and the case where zt is an i.i.d. zero-
mean shock; the optimal instrument rule is (the coe¢ cients are rounded to two decimal points),
it = 1:22￿t +0:43￿t￿1 +0:53￿t￿2 +0:18￿t￿3 +1:93yt ￿0:49yt￿1 +0:36it￿1 ￿0:09it￿2 ￿0:05it￿3:
C. The LindØ model: An empirical New Keynesian model
An empirical New Keynesian model estimated by LindØ [23] is
￿t = !f￿t+1jt + (1 ￿ !f)￿t￿1 + ￿yt + "￿t;
yt = ￿fyt+1jt + (1 ￿ ￿f)(￿y1yt￿1 + ￿y2yt￿2 + ￿y3yt￿3 + ￿y4yt￿4) ￿ ￿r(it ￿ ￿t+1jt) + "yt;
where the restriction
P4
j=1 ￿yj = 1 is imposed and "t ￿ ("￿t;"yt)0 is an i.i.d. shock with mean zero.
The estimated coe¢ cients (Table 6a in LindØ [23], non-farm business output) are shown in table
C.1.
Table C.1













































0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
￿1 0 ￿(1 ￿ !f) 0 0 1 ￿￿










































































The predetermined variables are "￿t, "yt, ￿t￿1, yt￿1, and it￿1, and the forward-looking variables
are ￿t and yt.
For a loss function (4.3) with ￿ = 1, ￿y = 1, and ￿￿i = 0:2, and the case where "t is an
i.i.d. zero-mean shock; the optimal instrument rule is (the coe¢ cients are rounded to two decimal
points),
it = 1:06"￿t + 1:38"yt + 0:58￿t￿1 + 0:78yt￿1 + 0:40 it￿1 + 0:02￿￿;t￿1;t￿1 + 0:20￿y;t￿1;t￿1;
where ￿￿;t￿1;t￿1 and ￿y;t￿1;t￿1 are the Lagrange multipliers for the two equations for the forward-
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D. Unanticipated policy-rate shocks: ￿Modest interventions￿ as in Leeper and
Zha [22]
The method of ￿modest interventions￿ of Leeper and Zha [22] can be interpreted as generating
central-bank projections that satisfy the restriction on the policy rate by adding a sequence of
additive shocks to the instrument rule. These planned shocks are unanticipated by the private
sector.
24In order to illustrate the Leeper and Zha [22] method of modest interventions, we set T = 0, in
which case
zt = ￿t;t
and the deviation is a simple zero-mean i.i.d. disturbance. We can then write the projection model
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for ￿ ￿ 0, where the superscript p denotes that this is the projection believed by the private sector
in period t.
Let us demonstrate the method of modest interventions only for the restriction (3.1). The central
bank plans to satisfy this restriction by a sequence of shocks f~ ￿t+￿;tgT
￿=0 that are unanticipated by







































There are some conceptual di¢ culties in a central bank announcing such a policy-rate path
and projection to the private sector. The projection is only relevant if the private sector does not
believe that the central bank will actually implement the path but instead follow the instrument
rule with zero expected shocks to the instrument rule. The method of modest interventions is
instead perhaps more appropriate for secret policy simulations and plans that are not announced
to the private sector, or for a situation when the announced policy-rate path is not credible and
the private sector is surprised each period when the path is implemented.
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